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advantages of incumbents to turn them 
to their own use. Without interoper-
ability, AT&T ruled the nation. With in-
teroperability, the ubiquity of the Bell 
System merely meant that anyone who 
could make an answering machine, ra-
dio bridge, or modem that could plug 
into an RJ-11 jack could sell into every 
house and business in America.
Everyone in the tech world claims 
to love interoperability—the technical 
ability to plug one product or service 
T
ECH’S MARKET CONCENTRATION— 
summed up brilliantly by 
Tom Eastman, a New Zealand 
software developer, as the 
transformation of the Inter-
net into “a group of five websites, each 
consisting of screenshots of text from 
the other four”—has aroused concern 
from regulators around the world.
In China tech giants have been ex-
plicitly co-opted an arm of the state. In 
Europe regulators hope to discipline 
the conduct of U.S.-based “Big Tech” 
firms by passing strict rules about pri-
vacy, copyright, and terrorist content 
and then slapping the companies with 
titanic fines when they fail to abide 
by them. At the same time, European 
leaders talk about cultivating “na-
tional champions”—monopolistically 
dominant firms with firm national al-
legiance to their local governments.
U.S. lawmakers are no more coher-
ent: on the one hand, Congress recent-
ly held the most aggressive antitrust 
hearings since the era of Ronald Rea-
gan, threatening to weaken the power 
of the giants by any means necessary. 
On the other hand, lawmakers on 
both sides of the aisle want to deputize 
Big Tech as part of law enforcement, 
charged with duties as varied as pre-
venting human trafficking, policing 
copyright infringement, imposing neu-
trality on public discourse, blocking 
disinformation, and ending harass-
ment and hate speech. If any of these 
duties can be performed (and some of 
them are sheer wishful thinking), they 
can only be performed by the very larg-
est of companies, monopolists who ex-
tract monopoly rents and use them to 
fund these auxiliary duties.
Tech has experienced waves of con-
centration before and resolved them 
with minimal state action. Instead, 
tech’s giants were often felled by in-
teroperability, which allows new market 
entrants to seize the “network effect” 
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V one despite the latter’s hostility, that is called “competitive compatibility”e and it has been around for about as long as the tech industry itself, from the mainframe daysf to the PC revolu-tiong to the operating systems warsh to 
the browser wars.i
All three forms of interoperabil-
ity share some characteristics: in each 
case, technologists devise a means by 
which two or more products or services 
can extend one another’s functionality, 
read one another’s files, or otherwise 
provide benefit to the users of one or 
both services.
The difference between these forms 
of interoperability is in the type of techni-
cal work necessary to accomplish them.
Firms that create APIs or other in-
terfaces to explicitly invite third-party 
add-ons contemplate both their users’ 
and employers’ priorities and try to 
strike a balance between them, craft-
ing a means whereby their inventions 
can be improved or adapted by others 
without foregoing unacceptable future 
revenues from making such improve-
ments on their own.
Firms that participate in stan-
dards-setting make a similar calculus 
but arrive at a different equilibrium. 
A multistakeholder format means 
that if you try to standardize, say, the 
costs of your products (in the hopes 
of getting others to shoulder them), 
while maintaining as proprietary the 
sources of your profits, you will have 
to convince other participants (in-
cluding your commercial rivals) that 
this is a fair arrangement. Standards 
Development Organizations describe 
these compromises as a major feature 
of standardization itself: rivals check 
one another’s most greedy impulses 
and arrive at a fair middle ground that 
does not unduly advantage any one firm 
(of course, in highly concentrated mar-
kets, large firms can collude to create 
standards that advantage them at the 
expense of potentially disruptive new 
market entrants).
These “cooperative interoperabil-







into another product or service—but 
interoperability covers a lot of territory, 
and depending on what’s meant by in-
teroperability, it can do a lot, a little, or 
nothing at all to protect users, innova-
tion and fairness.
Let’s start with a taxonomy of in-
teroperability.
Indifferent Interoperability
This is the most common form of in-
teroperability. Company A makes a 
product and Company B makes a thing 
that works with that product, but does 
not talk to Company A about it. Com-
pany A does not know or care to know 
about Company B’s add-on.
You can find fishbowls full of USB 
chargers that fit your car-lighter recep-
tacle at most gas stations for $0.50–
$1.00. Your auto manufacturer does 
not care if you buy one of those $0.50 
chargers and use it with your phone. 
It is your car, it is your car-lighter, it is 
your business.
Cooperative Interoperability
Sometimes, companies are eager to 
have others create add-ons for their 
products and services. One of the 
easiest ways to do this is to adopt a 
standard.
Digital standards also allow for 
a high degree of interoperability: a 
phone vendor or car-maker who in-
stalls a Bluetooth chip in your device 
lets you connect any Bluetooth acces-
sory with it—provided they take no 
steps to prevent that device from be-
ing connected.
This is where things get tricky: 
manufacturers and service providers 
who adopt digital standards can use 
computer programs to discriminate 
against accessories, even those that 
comply with the standard. This can be 
extremely beneficial to customers: you 
might get a Bluetooth “firewall” that 
warns you when you are connecting 
to a Bluetooth device that is known to 
have security defects, or that appears 
on a blacklist of malicious devices that 
siphon away your data and send it to 
identity thieves.
But as with all technological ques-
tions, the relevant question is not 
merely “What does this technology 
do?” It is “Who does this technology do 
it to and who does it do it for?”
The same tool that lets a manufac-
turer help you discriminate against 
Bluetooth accessories that harm your 
well-being allows the manufacturer 
to discriminate against devices that 
harm its well-being (say, a rival’s low-
er-cost headphones or keyboard) even 
if these accessories enhance your well-
being.
In the digital era, cooperative in-
teroperability is always subject to corpo-
rate boundaries. Even if a manufacturer 
is bound by law to adhere to a certain 
standard—say, to provide a certain elec-
tronic interface, or to allow access via 
a software interface like an API—those 
interfaces are still subject to limits that 
can be embodied in software.
What’s more, connected devices 
and services can adjust the degree of 
interoperability their digital interfac-
es permit from moment to moment, 
without notice or appeal, meaning the 
browser plugina or social media toolb 
you rely on might just stop working.
Which brings us to ...
Competitive Compatibility
Sometimes an add-on comes along 
that connects to a product whose man-
ufacturer is hostile to it: third-party 
inkjet ink, unauthorized iPhone apps, 
DVRs that record anything available 
through your cable package, and stores 
your recordings indefinitely.
Many products now have counter-
measures to resist this kind of interop-
erability: checks to ensure you are not 
buying car parts from third parties,c or 
fixing your own tractor.d
When a manufacturer builds a new 
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the possibility that the result of their 
efforts will be revisions to the original 
product or service explicitly designed 
to break their add-ons (indifferent op-
erators sometimes see their work un-
done by these updates, but only as an 
incidental effect and not out of any ani-
mus to them).
Competitive compatibility can also 
collapse into cooperative compatibil-
ity. Sometimes dominant companies 
surrender and agree to cooperate: to-
day’s office file formats are standard-
ized under ISO, the proprietary HTML 
extensions of the browser wars have 
been discarded or integrated into W3C 
standards, and so on.
There is a reason that compatibility 
tends to win out over the long run—it is 
the default state of the world—the sock 
company does not get to specify your 
shoes and the dairy does not get to dic-
tate which cereal you pour milk over.
But as technology markets have 
grown more concentratedj and less 
competitive, what was once business-
as-usual has become almost unthink-
able, not to mention legally danger-
ous, thanks to abuses of cybersecurity 
law,k copyright law,l and patent law.m
Taking competitive compatibil-
ity off the table breaks the tech cycle: a 
new company enters the market, rude-
ly shoulders aside its rivals, grows to 
dominance, and is dethroned in turn 
by a new upstart. Instead, today’s tech 
giants show every sign of establishing 
a permanent, dominant position over 
the Internet.
“Punishing” Big Tech by  
Granting It Perpetual Dominance
As states grapple with the worst as-
pects of the Internet—harassment, 
identity theft, authoritarian and rac-
ist organizing, disinformation—there 
is a real temptation to “solve” these 
problems by making Big Tech compa-
nies legally responsible for their users’ 
conduct. This is a cure that is worse 
than the disease: the big platforms 
cannot subject every user’s every post 
to human review, so they use filters, 






ments. These occur when new prod-
ucts and services leverage deliber-
ately interoperable technologies to 
do things that are orthogonal the 
considerations that went into the 
original. Think of the USB charger 
that plugs into a car’s lighter recep-
tacle: the firms that standardized the 
receptacle in the first place worked 
carefully to ensure none of their cars 
would be at a competitive disadvan-
tage when it came to attracting drivers 
who smoked; they gave careful consid-
eration to production, maintenance, 
and safety; but they did not even con-
sider a distant future in which a uni-
versal power-cable would emerge to 
charge lithium-ion cells in commodity 
consumer electronics.
As tobacco smoking declined and 
device-charging grew, automakers 
gave more consideration to this new 
use case, and even encouraged it, turn-
ing indifferent interoperability into co-
operative compatibility after the fact.
Unlike cooperative interoperators 
or indifferent interoperators, technol-
ogists engaged in competitive compat-
ibility have an adversarial relationship 
with those who came before them. To 
defeat the anti-tampering chip in a sin-
gle-use print-cartridge, or field a scrap-
er that exports user-data from a giant’s 
walled garden, or make a third-party 
office suite that seamlessly reads and 
writes an incumbent’s spreadsheets, 
word processor documents and pre-
sentations, a technologist must defeat 
obfuscation, encryption, intrusion de-
tection, and other countermeasures 
meant to thwart them.
The indifferent interoperator faces 
challenges that the cooperative inter-
operator does not. The cooperative in-
teroperate can put in a request for an 
API extension, or argue in a standards 
committee for the inclusion of a fea-
ture they need. The indifferent opera-
tor has no leverage over the product’s 
vendor(s), and has to work within the 
constraints of the product as it exists in 
the field.
Technologists who engage in com-
petitive compatibility, however, are 
actively working at cross-purposes to 
those who came before them. They 
are playing a game of cat-and-mouse, 
relying on exploiting defects, or cam-
ouflaging their tools as normal user 
activities, and they must contend with 
For further information 
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Instead of enshrining Google, Face-
book, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft 
as the Internet’s permanent overlords 
and then striving to make them as be-
nign as possible, we can fix the Inter-
net by making Big Tech less central to 
its future.
It’s possible that people will con-
nect tools to their Big Tech accounts 
that do ill-advised things they come 
to regret. That is kind of the point, re-
ally. After all, people can plug weird 
thingsu into their car’s lighter recep-
tacles, but the world is a better place 
when you get to decide how to use that 
useful, versatile ANSI/SAE J56-com-
pliant plug—not GM or Toyota.
Corporations Make 
Terrible Governments
AT&T was very nearly broken up in 
1956. The monopolistic conduct that 
had enraged rural Americans and 
would-be telecoms rivals reached 
such an undeniable nadir that the 
DoJ finally moved to break up Ma Bell. 
Only one thing stood in the way: the 
Pentagon. AT&T had been deputized 
to perform so many state-like duties 
during its decades of monopolistic 
operations that it had acquired pow-
erful stakeholders in the U.S. govern-
ment—it had its own army! The Pen-
tagon told the DoJ that it could not 
successfully occupy Korea an intact 
AT&T: it needed its Death Star to be a 
fully operational battle-station.
AT&T got a stay of execution, and 
instead was slapped with restrictions 
on its conduct that it skirted, violat-
ed, and flouted for the next three de-
cades, until, finally, it was broken up 
in 1982. That 26-year reprieve was the 
direct result of “fixing” AT&T by trying 
to co-opt it to serve the state, rather 
than using the power of the state to 
weaken it.
Government derive their power 
from the consent of the governed. 
Their legitimacy comes from their ac-
countability. Companies have share-
holders, not citizens. Businesses are 
not governments, and they have no 
businesses governing us. 
u See https://bit.ly/3fZ2FYD
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time, these filters are so expensive to 
operate that they make it impossible 
for would-be competitors to enter the 
market. YouTube has its $100 million 
Content ID copyright filter now, but 
if it had been forced to find an extra 
$100,000,000 to get started in 2005, it 
would have died a-borning.
But assigning these expensive, state-
like duties to tech companies also has 
the perverse effect of making it much 
harder to spark competitiono through 
careful regulation or break-ups. Once 
we decide that providing a forum for 
online activity is something that only 
giant companies with enough money 
to pay for filters can do, we also com-
mit to keeping the big companies big 
enough to perform those duties.
Interoperability to the Rescue?
It’s possible to create regulation that 
enhances competition. For example, 
we could introduce laws that force 
companies to open their back-endsp 
and oversee the companies to ensure 
they are not sneakily limiting their ri-
vals behind the scenes. This is already 
a feature of good telecommunications 
laws,q and there is a lot to like about it.
But a mandate to let users take their 
data from one company to another—or 
to send messages from one service to 
another—should be the opener, not the 
end-game. Any kind of interoperability 
mandate has the risk of becoming the 
ceiling on innovation, not the floor.
Fix the Internet,  
Not the Tech Companies




able: using the dominant services can 
be terrible, and now that they have 
broken the cycle of dominance and de-
throning, the Big Tech companies have 
fortified their summits such that oth-
ers dare not besiege them.r
The biggest Internet companies 
need more legal limits on their use and 
handling of personal data. That’s why 
we need a national privacy law, with a 
“private right of action” so that users 
can bring suit if they are victimized by 
surveillant companies. But laws that 
require filtering and monitoring user 
content make the Internet worse: more 
hostile to new market entrants (who 
cannot afford the costs of compliance) 
and worse for Internet users’ techno-
logical self-determination.
If we are worried that shadowy 
influence brokers are using Face-
book to launch sneaky persuasion 
campaigns,s we can either force Face-
book to make it more difficult for 
anyone to access your data without 
Facebook’s explicit approval (this as-
sumes that you trust Facebook to be 
the guardian of your best interests)—
or we can bar Facebook from using 
technical and legal countermeasurest 
to shut out new companies, co-ops, 
and projects that offer to let you talk to 
your Facebook friends without using 
Facebook’s tools, so you can configure 
your access to minimize Facebook’s 
surveillance and maximize your own 
freedom. That would mean reform-
ing the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act to clarify that it cannot be used to 
make Terms of Service violations into 
civil or criminal offenses; reforming 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
to clarify that defeating a technical 
protection measure is not an offense 
if doing so does not result in a copy-
right infringement; comprehensively 
narrowing software patents to allow 
for interoperable reimplementations; 
amending copyright to dispel any 
doubt as to whether reimplementing 
an API is a copyright infringement; 
and limiting the anticompetitive use 
of other statutes including those re-
lating to trade secrecy, nondisclosure, 
and noncompete.
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